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AT WHAT COST? ANALYZING THE STANDING ELEMENT OF
THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CORRUPTION
ORGANIZATIONS ACT (RICO) IN
RESPONSE TO EVANS V. ARIZONA
CARDINALS FOOTBALL CLUB
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, society is constantly adding to its body of knowledge
about the long-term effects of injuries resulting from professional
sports.1  While the standard response to player complaints pertain-
ing to injuries has always been “[they] knew the risk of playing a
sport”, a multitude of recent cases grappled with the idea of
whether a player can truly assume a risk, especially if the full extent
of that risk is unknown.2  Carving a pathway in the area of player
settlements, the groundbreaking National Football League (“NFL”)
concussion litigation and settlement allowed former players the
right to recover based on past actions with present-day effects.3  Af-
1. See Play Smart Play Safe, 2017 Injury Data, NFL https://www.playsmartplay
safe.com/newsroom/reports/2017-injury-data/ [https://perma.cc/36CV-9JRX]
(last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (showing increase in many injuries during practices and
games); see also Margot Putukian, Mind, Body and Sport: How Beings Injured Affects
Mental Health, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sport-science-institute/mind-body-
and-sport-how-being-injured-affects-mental-health [https://perma.cc/Q7XT-
3ANL] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (detailing new developments surrounding how
depression plagues injured athletes and prolongs recovery); see generally Michael
Powell, Mounds of Injury Data Can’t Bury Brutality of the NFL, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/sports/nfl-injuries-report.html
[https://perma.cc/M7V6-3Y59] (“But the bottom line does not change: We can
pile protocol atop protocol and drop a moonshot’s worth of dough on studies, but
at its core, football remains an inherently brutal and dangerous sport.”).
2. See Muchhala v. U.S., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1228 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (“In
general, the doctrine [of primary assumption of the risk] applies to activities or
sports where ‘conditions or conduct that otherwise might be viewed as dangerous
often are an integral part of the sport itself.’” (quoting Saville v. Sierra College,
133 Cal. App. 4th 857, 866 (2005))); see also In re Nat’l Football League Players
Concussion Litig., 821 F.3d 410, 420 (3d Cir. 2016) [hereinafter NFL Concus-
sion](referring to class action litigation that resulted in settlement for former play-
ers suffering from early on-set traumatic brain injuries resulting from former
professional careers); In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig.,
327 F.R.D. 245, 265 (D. Minn. 2018) (detailing class action suit filed by former and
current professional hockey players for injuries stemming from repetitive brain
injuries).
3. See In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d at
447–48 (“[The] settlement will provide nearly $1 billion in value to the class of
retired players. It is a testament to the players, researchers, and advocates who have
worked to expose the true human costs of a sport so many love. Though not per-
fect, it is fair.”).
(67)
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ter the settlement, a landslide of litigant athletes filed lawsuits
against their respective leagues, arguing the league should be held
accountable for their injuries.4  With more information coming for-
ward regarding whether an athlete can assume an unknown risk,
claimants are becoming more advantaged in the court room in all
ways but one: the law.5
With a majority of state negligence laws barring relief for claim-
ants due to their athlete status, claimants turned to other statutes
for relief.6  One of these statutes, the Racketeer Influenced and
Corruption Organizations Act (“RICO”), provides relief to those
suffering as a result of intentional organized crime within a busi-
4. See id. at 425 (showing hundreds of litigants claiming football exposed
them to early stage brain injuries); see also Sean McIndoe, How the NHL Concussion
Lawsuit Could Threaten the Future of the League, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2017) https:/
/www.theguardian.com/sport/2017/apr/05/nhl-concussion-lawsuit-could-
threaten-future-of-league [https://perma.cc/6JD7-A4KP] (detailing players’ proxi-
mate cause arguments that sport caused chronic traumatic brain injuries).  “Much
of this resolves around a degenerative disease called chronic traumatic en-
cephalopathy, or CTE.  Most experts agree that CTE is related to a history of con-
cussions and brain injuries, and can lead to all sorts of symptoms late in life,
including dementia, aggression, depression and suicidal thoughts.” Id. (illustrat-
ing pervasive nature of unknown injuries resulting from football).
5. See 114 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 269 (2009) (explaining “most jurisdictions im-
pose limitations on liability in order to promote vigorous participating in athletics
which courts fear might be ‘chilled’ by applying ordinary liability standards”).  In
some states, a claimant may be able to overcome the assumption of the risk de-
fense by showing evidence of intentional action or reckless conduct outside the
realm of the sport that lead to claimant’s injury. See e.g., Mammoth Mountain Ski
Area v. Graham, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1367, 1369 (3d Dist. 2006) (reversing summary
judgment and stating assumption of risk doctrine does not protect conduct outside
scope of normal activities involved with sport).  Reckless is defined as conduct that
creates an unreasonable risk of harm to someone. See Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 500 (AM. LAW INST., 1965) (detailing standard for cause of action).  Even
states that do not recognize the default assumption of the risk defense generally
preclude all negligence claims in the sports realm unless a claimant, as a threshold
matter, can show proof of intentional or reckless conduct. See, e.g., Gauvin v.
Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 97 (Mass. 1989) (showing example of jurisdiction that does
not recognize assumption of risk doctrine, but applies different standard for negli-
gence liability in sports cases); see generally In re Nat’l Football League Players Con-
cussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d at 441 (detailing argument that player cannot truly
assume unknown risk in sports context); see also Mike Hughlett, Lawsuit Against
NHL Over Concussions Heating Up, STAR TRIBUNE (Apr. 24, 2017, 4:34 PM), http://
www.startribune.com/lawsuit-against-nhl-over-concussions-heating-up/420199203/
[https://perma.cc/9B58-6VZM] (detailing arguments of inability to assume un-
known risk).
6. See Knight v. Jewett, 3 Cal. 4th 296, 314 (1992) (explaining that assumption
of risk, in states that recognize it, provides complete defense to tort of negligence
in sports injury cases); see generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–64 (2009) (detailing Racke-
teering and Organized Crime statute, including definitions, prohibited activities,
and criminal and civil penalties); see also 114 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 269 (2009) (“[A]n
advantage with intentional tort claims is that they expand the plaintiff’s remedies
to include a potential punitive damages claim.”) (explaining Overall v. Kadella,
138 Mich. App. 351 (1984)).
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ness enterprise.7  RICO and its subsections allow for civil and crimi-
nal penalties from persons receiving income as a result of
racketeering activity that affects interstate commerce.8  With an in-
crease in lawsuits alleging long-standing practices as being unethi-
cal and even criminal within the sports world, RICO provides a
method for claimants to work outside the traditional doctrine of
assumption of the risk.9  In Evans v. Arizona Football Club,10 claim-
ants brought action under RICO for their current injuries which
resulted from past over-consumption of prescription pain-killers
under the direction of team officials.11  Claimants alleged a ruinous
“return to play” culture that manifested across all NFL teams and
operated in direct contradiction to representations that the clubs
placed the health and well-being of its players first.12  In dismissing
the RICO claim, the Northern District of California detailed how
claimants did not have standing because claimants failed to show an
7. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2009) (“It shall be unlawful for any person
who has received an income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racke-
teering activity . . . to use or invest, directly or indirectly . . . in acquisition of any
interest in . . . activities which affect interstate or foreign commerce.”); see also 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1) (detailing definition of “racketeering activity”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(4) (2009) (defining “enterprise” as “includ[ing] any individual, partner-
ship, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”); but see U.S. v. Turkette,
452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) (“The language of the statute however—most reliable
evidence of its intent—reveals that Congress opted for a far broader definition of
the word ‘enterprise’”).
8. See 18 U.S.C.§ 1963 (2009) (detailing plethora of criminal penalties availa-
ble for those found in violation of RICO statute); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2009)
(explaining civil remedies for claimants are successful in bringing RICO action).
For a further discussion about the definition of “racketeering activity”, see supra
note 7 and accompanying text. R
9. See Scooby Axson, Adidas Sued by Ex-Louisville Recruit Bowen Under RICO Act,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.si.com/college/2018/11/19/
adidas-lawsuit-former-louisville-recruit-brian-bowen [https://perma.cc/MD42-
QNMR] (explaining former recruit suing Adidas under RICO statute); see also Ev-
ans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342, 345 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (illustrating lead case where multiple plaintiffs filed RICO claims); see gener-
ally In re National Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d at
420 (showing increase in highly publicized sports injury cases); In re Nat’l Hockey
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 327 F.R.D. 245, 265 (D. Minn. 2018) (dis-
cussing same increase in highly publicized sports injury cases).
10. 231 F.  Supp. 3d 342 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
11. See id. at 346 (stating claimants brought conspiracy and RICO charges as
result of “return to play” mentality throughout NFL).  For a further discussion de-
tailing how the “return to play” mentality manifested in the lead case, see infra
notes 60–67 and accompanying text. R
12. See id. at 346 (detailing how overuse of prescription drugs in lieu of
proper time off led to a multitude of long-term effects).  For a further discussion of
the actions by club officials taken in direct contradiction to team policies to place
player safety first, see infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. R
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injury to their business or property.13  Further, the court dismissed
claims alleging conspiratorial behavior by all league teams for lack
of supporting evidence.14  Unable to show evidence of a cognizable
economic injury, claimants were only left with the claims of inten-
tional misrepresentation and concealment.15
This Casenote will explore how the current method for estab-
lishing standing under RICO is contrary to the intent of legislature,
and therefore, should be construed broadly to effectuate the pur-
pose behind the act itself.16  Specifically, the statute should be read
to include an injury to a person’s livelihood or business practice.17
Section II will detail RICO’s legislative, purpose, and evolution over
time.18  Section III will explain the relevant facts of the lead case,
Evans, as well as that court’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ claims.19
Next, Section IV will illustrate how expanding the standing ele-
ments of RICO claims would fulfill the purpose of the legislation
13. See id. at 349 (citing Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783,
785–88 (9th Cir. 1992)) (“Personal injuries, however, are not injuries to ‘business
or property’ compensable under RICO . . . . Even if plaintiffs suggest they recently
lost employment opportunities or earning capacity wholly as a result of recently
discovered health problems, such losses, while economic, nonetheless derive from
fundamentally personal injuries and thus cannot give rise to a RICO claim.”).  For
a further discussion regarding the court’s rationale in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims,
see infra notes 83–102 and accompanying text. R
14. See id. at 356 (“At best, the amended complaint alleged the NFL has a
return-to-play culture driving individuals across the board—including trainers, doc-
tors, and the players themselves—to prioritize game performance over players’
health . . . describing the problem in the NFL as a permeative ‘business culture’
rather than a practice, policy, or conspiracy.”).  For a further discussion about the
court’s rationale in dismissing these claims, see infra notes 101–111 and accompa- R
nying text.
15. See generally Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 357 (showing defendant’s motion to
dismiss is denied as to intentional misrepresentation and concealment claims
against Lions, Raiders, Broncos, Packers, Seahawks, Dolphins, Charges, and Vik-
ings).  For a further discussion about the court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ RICO
claims, see infra notes 95–110 and accompanying text. R
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Civil RICO plaintiff must show: (1) that alleged
harm qualifies as injury to business or property; and (2) harm was proximately
caused by RICO violation.”); see also Oscar, 965 F.2d at 785 (1992)  (“[S]howing of
‘injury’ for RICO purposes requires proof of concrete financial loss, not merely
‘injury to a valuable intangible property interest.’” (quoting Berg v. First State Ins.
Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990))).
17. For a further discussion about how the court in the lead case should have
treated the standing issue with regards to RICO’s legislative intent, see infra notes
147–155 and accompanying text. R
18. For a further discussion about the background of RICO and the reason
for its enactment, see infra notes 47–69 and accompanying text. R
19. For a further discussion about the facts of the Evans case, see infra notes
70–88 and accompanying text. R
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without negatively impacting future litigants.20  Further, Section V
will analyze how the expansion of the standing element would have
a positive effect on the societal shift towards evolving concepts of
relief for sports injuries.21  As a result, this Article argues that the
injuries alleged by claimants in Evans fulfilled the injury element
and thus have standing under RICO because claimants felt long
term effects on their property and business interests.22
II. WHO GETS IN?: A HISTORY OF SPORTS INJURIES AND THE LAW
In a claim of negligence, defendants are afforded the opportu-
nity to present an assumption of the risk defense.23  This allows the
defendant to undermine a claim of negligence by arguing that the
plaintiff was aware of and consented to being exposed to the risk
associated with  a particular activity that eventually resulted in the
injury.24  Applying the assumption of the risk theory to sports, negli-
gence defendants (usually sports teams or leagues) are equipped
with an almost impenetrable shield from liability when athletes at-
tempt to gather relief for the injuries they sustained on the field.25
In other words, if it can be shown the claimant participated in the
20. For a further discussion about the legislative purpose of RICO, see infra
notes 47–69 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion about the analysis of R
the court’s use of the RICO statue, see infra notes 89–111 and accompanying text. R
21. For a further discussion about how the expansion of RICO would have a
positive effect on future litigants, see infra notes 147–155 and accompanying text. R
22. For a further discussion regarding the facts of Evans and injuries alleged,
see infra notes 88–105 and accompanying text. R
23. See Restatement (Third) of Torts, §3 (2010) (explaining negligence re-
quires showing of duty, breach, causation, and harm).
24. See 45 U.S.C. § 54 (explaining general “assumption of risks of employ-
ment”); see also Muchhala v. U.S., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1228 (E.D. Cal. 2007)
(“Doctrine of primary assumption of the risk, under which a plaintiff is completely
barred from recovery if the defendant owed no legal duty to protect him from the
particular risk that caused the injury, is a complete defense to a negligence
claim.”).  “In these types of activities, the integral conditions of the sport or the
inherent risks of careless conduct by others render the possibility of injury obvious,
and negate the duty of care usually owed by the defendant for those particular
risks of harm.” Id. at 1229 (quoting Saville v. Sierra College, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 515,
522 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2005)).
25. See Michael McCann, Analyzing Dustin Fowler’s Lawsuit Against the Chicago
White Sox, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 13, 2018), https://www.si.com/mlb/2018/01/
13/dustin-fowler-injury-white-sox-lawsuit-analysis [https://perma.cc/YF36-88G6]
(“When a professional athlete is injured in a game, hardly anyone asks whether the
injury could lead to a lawsuit . . . [i]njuries are part of every sport.  Athletes, espe-
cially at the professional level, assume the risk of danger on every play.”); see also
Bukowski v. Clarkson Univ., 19 N.Y.3d 353, 356 (Ct. App. N.Y. 2012) (holding that
pitcher on college baseball team who was injured during practice assumed the risk
of participation in baseball).  Further, the court stated the assumption of the risk
doctrine “applies where a consenting participant in sporting and amusement activ-
ities is aware of the risks; has an appreciation of the nature of the risks; and volun-
5
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sport with awareness of the possibility of injury, then the claimant
will not be able to meet their burden.26  Current pending lawsuits
and recent court decisions have sought to undermine this defense
and break through this unbreakable barrier.27  Other recent sports
injury lawsuits involved claims under the purview of different stat-
ues in order to avoid facing this assumption of the risk defense.28
A. The Economic Interest of Professional Athletes
The economic value of a professional athlete’s sporting career
can potentially result in earnings that greatly exceed the specific
numerical value guaranteed in their playing contracts.29 In addition
to their contracted salaries, professional athletes generate supple-
mental revenue due to their skill, expertise, and general public rec-
ognition, examples include team incentives like training camps,
brand endorsements, future coaching jobs, sports broadcasting and
reporting positions, and even public appearances.30  Some of the
world’s highest paid athletes earn exponentially more revenue from
endorsement deals than from their professional athletic con-
tracts.31  In fact, the only NFL player featured on the international
tarily assumes the risks.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning
assumption of risk defense failed to apply).
26. See McCann, supra note 25 (explaining assumption of risk in sports). R
27. See id. (“Could some [injuries] occur not because ‘that’s just the way the
game is played’ but rather because other people were negligent in designing how
the game would be played?”); see also Dent v. NFL, 902 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2018)
(explaining class of former NFL players brought suit alleging their respective
teams had negligently overprescribed painkillers).
28. See Alexander J. Drago, Assumption of Risk: An Age-Old Defense Still Viable in
Sports and Recreation Cases, 12 FORD. INTELL. PROP., MEDIA AND ENT. L.J. 583, 608
(2002) (summarizing multiple methods with which claimants are barred and aided
by old negligence law).
29. See Kurt Badenhausen, The 25 Highest-Paid Athletes of All Time, FORBES
(Dec. 3, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhausen/2017/12/13/
the-25-highest-paid-athletes-of-all-time/#65a0faf54b64 [https://perma.cc/LQ9Z-
F5PD] (detailing revenue gained through endorsements and other contracts, all
resulting from professional careers).
30. See Chris Smith, The Highest-Paid Coaches in U.S. Sports, FORBES (May 22,
2013, 10:04 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/05/22/the-
highest-paid-coaches-in-us-sports/#7f68162b7f61 [https://perma.cc/Y5ES-DQYY]
(illustrating connection between successful professional career and lucrative
coaching jobs); see also Fred Brown, Why Do Some Athletes Make Millions? Because Fans
Support Them, WASH. POST (Jul. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifes-
tyle/kidspost/why-do-some-athletes-make-millions-because-fans-support-them/
2017/07/26/f743ae7e-70b6-11e7-8f39-eeb7d3a2d304_story.html?utm_term=.
2184d4f69721 [https://perma.cc/332E-KFXG] (stating reason for inflated athlete
salaries is because of fan engagement, endorsements, and TV deals).
31. See Brown, supra note 30 (listing revenue sources for each of twenty-five R
highest paid athletes); see also Chelena Goldman, These Star Athletes Earned More
Money from Endorsements in 2018, CHEATSHEET (June 26, 2018), https://www.cheat
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list of the top twenty-five highest paid athletes of all time is Peyton
Manning, who regularly partakes in numerous endorsement deals
and speaking engagements even in his retirement.32  During Man-
ning’s career, which began with the Indianapolis Colts in 1998, un-
til his retirement at the end of the 2015 season, Manning earned a
total of $249 million from his contracts with NFL teams.33  In addi-
tion, Manning is estimated to have earned roughly an addition
$150 million from off-the-field endeavors.34  Even in retirement,
Manning continues to profit from his NFL career through these
peripheral deals.35
While these supplemental incomes have the potential to more
than double a player’s revenue, endorsement deals are not availa-
ble to each player who signs a professional contract.36  Companies
seeking professional athletes to sell their products look for two sim-
ple characteristics: the person must be a famous and well-known
professional athlete.37  Hallmarks of this status usually encompass
factors such as length of career, success in championships, and
overall presence on a professional team.38 Researchers have found
sheet.com/sports/these-star-athletes-earned-more-money-from-endorsements-in-
2018. html/ [https://perma.cc/2NAV-NEK8] (listing prominent professional ath-
letes internationally who made more money from endorsement deals than their
specific playing contracts).
32. See Kurt Badenhausen, Peyton Manning Retires With Record $400 Million in
Career Earnings, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2016, 11:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
kurtbadenhausen/2016/03/07/peyton-manning-retires-with-record-400-million-
in-career-earnings/#7da0b5c6488f [https://perma.cc/88VQ-Z9G9] (explaining
Peyton Manning’s net worth as $480 million and detailing his current endorse-
ment deals).
33. See id.  (detailing breakdown of Manning’s career earnings as roughly fifty-
eight million dollars on his first contract, one hundred and thirty-three million
dollars on his second, and nineteen million dollars on his final contract).
34. See id. (explaining Manning’s involvement with Nike, DirecTV, Buick,
Papa John’s, Nationwide, and Fanatics).
35. See id. (describing how Manning earned roughly twelve million dollars in
2016 based on endorsement and brand deals).
36. See 7 Athletes Who Make Insane Money Off Endorsement Deals, STACK, https://
www.stack.com/a/7-athletes-who-make-insane-money-off-endorsement-deals
[https://perma.cc/72LZ-C76M] (last updated Aug. 10, 2018) (explaining why
companies are drawn to particular players from each sport).
37. See id. (explaining how companies are willing to pay large sums of money
for endorsement deal, especially when the athlete is one of the biggest names in
their sport).
38. See Badenhausen, supra note 32 (describing success of athletes’ supple- R
mental income depending on their particular sport); but cf. Brett Hershman, Are
Athletic Endorsements Worth It Anymore?, BENZINGA (Aug. 25, 2017, 2:47 PM), https://
www.benzinga.com/news/17/08/9978297/are-athletic-endorsements-worth-it-any-
more [https://perma.cc/MBK9-CL85] (detailing decline in endorsement deals,
but reaffirming idea that successful leagues and players are granted more endorse-
ment deals).
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that an athlete’s likability and popularity within a sport can provide
a powerful tool to predict endorsement or sponsorship potential.39
Thus, an athlete not only has an interest in the success of their play-
ing career for on-the-field reasons, but also for future off-the-field
purposes.40
Endorsement deals are not the only stream of revenue for cur-
rent professional athletes off-the-field.41  Coaching positions pro-
vide another path for players to pursue at the conclusion of their
professional careers.42  Specifically, coaching allows an athlete the
opportunity to transform the skills and lessons learned in their play-
ing careers into a lucrative coaching career.43  Legendary athletes
such as Mike Ditka and Tom Flores were able to make their way
into the NFL history books as players on the field, but even more so
as coaches due to their accomplishments and career on the side-
39. See Daniel Rascher et al., What Drives Endorsement Earnings for Superstar Ath-
letes, SPORT MGMT. (2017) available at https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcon-
tent.cgi?article=1009&contextSM [https://perma.cc/7ABR-L2WM] (researching
potential effect likability and familiarity have on endorsement offers received).
40. See Badenhausen, supra note 32 (explaining history, expertise, and qualifi- R
cations of each highly paid athlete); see generally Brown, supra note 30 (explaining R
reason why professional athletes make large sums of money is because “[m]edia
companies pay the league and teams billions of dollars for the rights to show
[games] on television” and “[t]hese businesses pay the money  because they know
millions of fans will watch the games . . . [and] networks then sell ads for cars,
pizza, and lots of other stuff”).
41. See Kenneth Kiewnowski, The Top 10 Former Athletes Who Earned the Most in
‘Retirement’, CNBC (Feb. 19, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/16/
the-top-10-former-athletes-who-earned-the-most-in-retirement.html [https://
perma.cc/WD8Q-5ZX6] (detailing athletes who earned money through fashion
brands, golf-course design, coaching, investment deals, and other methods apart
from strict endorsement deals).
42. See Doug Sibor, A Definitive Ranking of the Best Athletes Turned Coaches, COM-
PLEX (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.complex.com/sports/2014/09/a-definitive-
ranking-of-the-best-athletes-turned-coaches/ [https://perma.cc/JZL3-R5DX] (ex-
plaining that coaching is not feasible for every former player, but “[t]hat’s not to
say, however, that it is impossible to enjoy a long, fruitful careers as both a pro
athlete and pro coach”).
43. See id. (detailing top twenty highest paid coaches who were former
athletes).
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lines.44  Unlike athletes, coaches do not need to have a successful
athletic career in order to receive an endorsement deal.45
While players primarily receive deals based on their talents in a
respective sport, a coach may receive an endorsement deal based
on the performance or notoriety of the team they coach.46  Coach-
ing still provides players an opportunity to evolve and apply their
knowledge of the sport they undoubtedly spent most of their lives
playing into a long-lasting career, one that doesn’t expire because
of age.47
A professional athlete’s “body of work” is, quite literally, their
physique and the opportunities their athleticism provides for suc-
cessful performance in their respective sports.48  Because an ath-
lete’s body is so important, interests in athlete health, well-being,
and longevity during and after participation are at the forefront of
athlete concerns.49  Injuries, no matter how small or large, can have
a severe financial impact on a player’s future earnings.50  Although
determining the potential earnings for an athlete is nearly impossi-
ble to calculate, it is easy to identify that such earning potential,
whether through playing contracts or future revenue-generating
44. See id. (“[Tom Flores] was a trailblazer in several different areas during his
NFL career . . . . Mike Ditka is still regarded as one of the greatest tight ends in
NFL history, revolutionizing the position.”); c.f. John Portch, Can Former Athletes Be
Taught How to Coach?, LEADERS IN SPORT (Sept. 1, 2018), https://leadersin-
sport.com/performance/can-former-athletes-taught-coach/ [https://perma.cc/
E83E-ZP7V] (discussing traits typically possessed by those players who turn profes-
sional careers into coaching opportunities and how qualities of each position often
are contrary to one another).
45. See Sibor, supra note 42 (explaining how players are able to transform R
their athletic careers into coaching careers).
46. See Smith, supra note 30 (explaining various athletic backgrounds of high- R
est paid coaches).
47. See Portch, supra note 44 (“There is a place for those who haven’t played R
at the highest level and the coaching experience they bring to the table . . . .”); see
also Sibor, supra note 42 (explaining longevity of some legendary coaches and their R
playing careers).
48. See Twila Keim, Physicians for Professional Sports Teams: Health Care Under the
Pressure of Economic and Commercial Interests, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 196, 212–15
(1999) (illustrating conflicting economic and health interests for professionals as-
sociated with sports).
49. See id. at 222–23 (describing self-interest factors that allow athletes to be-
come so successful in long run).  For a further discussion about the opportunities
available to professional athletes turned coaches, see supra notes 37–40 and accom- R
panying text.
50. See Stephen Smith, What is the Real Cost of Injuries in Professional Sport?, ME-
DIUM (May 16, 2016), https://medium.com/@stephensmith_ie/what-is-the-real-
cost-of-injuries-in-professional-sport-fee1d66a7502 [https://perma.cc/T6P9-
EQ3Q] (arguing that injuries result in loss of chance to win championships and
other great sporting feats); see also Badenhausen, supra note 32 (detailing pay cut R
Peyton Manning took from Broncos due to neck injury).
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opportunities, may severely diminish as a result of suffering an
injury.51
B. The “Return to Play” Mentality
The variety of factors that encompass an athlete’s economic
interest in their performance and health while playing a profes-
sional sport often manifest in a “return to play” mentality which
pushes athletes to compete above all else.52  This mentality is collo-
quially defined as an invisible hand, either monetary or goal driven,
that creates pressure for players to compete regardless of their phys-
ical ability to do so.53  The mentality places the health and safety of
athletes in the backseat as the professional and monetary goals take
the steering wheel.54  This mentality results in players returning
from injuries too quickly or, in the extreme, players never sitting
out of the game at all.55
51. See Smith, supra note 50 (“When we think about salaries paid to elite R
athletes today it’s pretty easy to understand that it’s a huge waste of money and
financial drain on an organisation when an athlete is injured and teams have mil-
lions of dollars sitting on the bench . . . .”).  In 2015, reports show NFL teams paid
injured athletes a sum in excess of $450 million. See id. (reporting estimated total
salaries paid).
52. See Tim Fitzgerald, Today’s Coaches and Trainers are Promoting Safety,
Strength, and Conditioning to Protect Players from Disabling Injuries, HEALTHDAY, https:/
/consumer.healthday.com/encyclopedia/work-and-health-41/occupational-
health-news-507/professional-athletes-648171.html [https://perma.cc/X28V-
HPSS] (last updated Jan. 1, 2020) (explaining return to play mentality as being
detrimental to athletes because “[w]hen a player is on the field injured, neither
he, nor his team benefits”); see also NBA Twitter and Media Reports, Kevin Durant
Confirms He Suffered Raptured Right Achilles, NBA (Jun. 13, 2019, 7:40 AM), https://
www.nba.com/article/2019/06/12/warriors-durant-achilles-injury-update [https:/
/perma.cc/75P3-849U] (detailing disastrous effects of Kevin Durant’s injury when
he returned to help his team win NBA Finals).
53. See Fitzgerald, supra note 52 (explaining “playing through pain” mentality R
that is present throughout all teams, especially amongst younger players).  How-
ever, athletes are often seen as embodying a “competitive fire” that presents the
ability to cloud their judgment when it comes to returning to the game prior to
full rehabilitation. See id.
54. See id. (expressing how veteran players often are more cognizant of limits
of their body with regards to injuries, while younger players do not acknowledge
long-term implications of improperly treated injuries).
55. See Dan Pompei, Inside the NFL’s Secret World of Injuries, BLEACHER REPORT
(Dec. 14, 2017), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2749101-inside-the-nfls-se-
cret-world-of-injuries [https://perma.cc/KW38-5U8V] (detailing that players
would return to football games even though they were hurt, simply to make sure
there were enough players on the field).  Players and team officials often times
would not want opposing teams, fans, or anyone else to know about athlete inju-
ries.  See id. Therefore, athletes sometimes taped both ankles, or knees, in order to
disguise the look of injury. See id. (explaining how players would shield their inju-
ries).  Further, even injuries that are thoroughly treated by team medical staff are
often treated less sensitively in the press. See id. (detailing public perception of
professional sports injuries).
10
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Although the return to play mentality has always been a by-
product of competition, the effects should be viewed with a specific
eye towards the current culture of injury and professional sport as a
whole.56  The drastic increase in the abuse of opioid drugs, com-
monly referred to as the “opioid crisis”, transcends all geographic,
economic, and cultural barriers.57  The term “opioid” refers to pain
suppressing drugs such as oxycodone, hydrocodone, morphine,
and others.58  In recent years, the rise of opioid use has been dealt
with via intervention from the legislature as well as growing societal
knowledge.59  Communities have shifted towards a path of educa-
tion, awareness, and prevention.60  However, the intersection of the
byproduct of these drugs and the return to play mentality, presents
56. See Opioid Epidemic, DISA, https://disa.com/drug-alcohol-testing/opioid-
epidemic [https://perma.cc/NH5Z-7ZFA] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (reporting
that Opioid Crisis has cost the nation millions of dollars since its inception in 2001,
and drastic increase in 2015); see also Doug Currivan & Wayne Mascarella, Under-
standing, Preventing, and Treating Opioid Abuse, RTI, https://www.rti.org/emerging-
issue/understanding-preventing-and-treating-opioid-abuse [https://perma.cc/
ZZ4L-KBDC] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (explaining that leading experts are “stud-
ying prevention and public communication tactics, strategies to reach out to at-risk
and vulnerable populations”).  Many experts agree that the most effective way to
deal with the vast number of citizens impacted by the opioid crisis is a “coordi-
nated response from every angle.” See id. (describing general consensus of field’s
experts on how to proceed comprehensively).
57. See Scott Higham et al., 76 Billion Opioid Pills: Newly Released Federal Data
Unmasks the Epidemic, WASH. POST (Jul. 16, 2019, 8:19 PM), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/investigations/76-billion-opioid-pills-newly-released-federal-data-un-
masks-the-epidemic/2019/07/16/5f29fd62-a73e-11e9-86dd-d7f0e60391e9_story.
html?utm_term=.5c0edbcefc3b [https://perma.cc/WDD4-E4MN] (explaining
sheer amount of pain pills present throughout United States between 2006 and
2012).   The article suggests that the data collected by the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration estimates these opioids to be responsible for nearly 100,000 deaths
during the same period. See id. (referencing six years of data from DEA database).
58. See Opioids, NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE, https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-
abuse/opioids [https://perma.cc/DD4K-GZT7] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (detail-
ing multiple generic and specific names of common opioid drugs at issue through-
out opioid crisis).
59. See id. (explaining that “[opioids] are generally safe when taken for a
short time and as prescribed by a doctor, but because they produce euphoria in
addition to pain relief, they can misused”); see generally National Take Back Day,
DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., https://takebackday.dea.gov [https://perma.cc/26A5-
URAM] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (illustrating country-wide procedures for re-
turning and disposing opioid drugs).
60. See Higham, supra note 57 (illustrating data that “provides statistical in- R
sights that help pinpoint the origins and spread of the opioid epidemic – an epi-
demic that thousands of communities across the country argue was both sparked
and inflamed by opioid manufacturers, distributors, and pharmacies”).
11
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the ability for the very disease society is trying to prevent,
addiction.61
C. The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO)
Professional sports organizations, like many business enter-
prises, fall under the purview of economic regulations and laws.62
Antitrust law, originally drafted to forbid restrictions on interstate
trade, has been applied to lawsuits amongst all five major profes-
sional sports leagues, the NFL, NBA, NHL, MLB and MLS.63  The
financial interests of each league require teams to carefully balance
the economic aspect of their sports with the best interests of their
players.64  Contrary to the standard structure of corporate business
organizations, leagues are uniquely organized.65  Rather than the
normal organizational structure of a business, a league is composed
of many parts, or teams, that create a single unit with a common
goal.66  Before analyzing the applicability of the RICO statute in Ev-
61. For a further discussion pertaining to the return to play mentality, see
supra notes 47–55 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion regarding the
long-term effects of opioid use, see infra notes 200–209 and accompanying text. R
62. For a further discussion pertaining to certain laws applying broadly to
sports, see infra note 20 and accompanying text. R
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (detailing Sherman Antitrust Act and illegality of
restraints of trade); see also Nathaniel Grow, There’s No “I” in “League”: Professional
Sport Leagues and the Entity Defense, 105 MICH. L. REV. 183, 184 (2006) (“Section 1 of
the Sherman Act prohibits ‘[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy[ ] in
restraint of trade’”); see generally Howard Bartee, Jr., The Role of Antitrust Laws in the
Professional Sports Industry From a Financial Perspective, SPORT JOURNAL, (Mar. 2,
2005), http://thesportjournal.org/article/the-role-of-antitrust-laws-in-the-profes-
sional-  sports-industry-from-a-financial-perspective/#post/0 [https://perma.cc/
S3XJ-P9UZ] (“The [professional sports industry] controls both activities and atti-
tudes, solicits action and reactions, and demands the immediate attention of fans,
arbitrators, mediators, lawyers, judges, players, television networks and manage-
ment. However, as an entity, it is regulated as a business activity with and without
exemptions from the federal government.”).
64. See Grow, supra note 63, at 184 (citing James Quirk & Rodney D. Fort, Pay R
Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports, at 3 (1992)) (“With high salaries, ticket
prices, and profits, professional sports are no longer just a game, but a big business
worth billions of dollars.”); see also Bartee, supra note 63 (citing Jeffrey S. Moorad, R
Major League Baseball’s Labor Turmoil: The Failure of the Counter-Revolution, 4 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 53 (1997)) (detailing baseball’s long and rocky history with
antitrust law).
65. See League Governance, NFL, https://operations.nfl.com/football-ops/
league-governance/ [https://perma.cc/V6MM-9URW] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019)
(describing hierarchy of league management and structure overall).
66. See Grow, supra note 63, at 186 (citing Franklin M. Fisher et. al., The Eco- R
nomic of Sports Leagues—The Chicago Bulls Case, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L. J. 1, 5 (1999))
(explaining how “single entity” of professional team franchise is made up of many
independent parts).
12
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ans, it is important to consider the principle reason for the statute’s
enactment in the first place.67
In 1970, Congress sought to combat the problem of organized
crime by passing the Organized Crime Control Act (“OCCA”), a
portion of which included RICO.68  The primary focus of the
OCCA was the prevention and punishment of organized crime af-
fecting financial aspects of interstate commerce.69  Going largely
unnoticed throughout the 1970s, RICO itself created a civil cause of
action for a person claiming damage to a property or business.70  In
Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co.,71 the US Supreme Court suggested
other courts should pay special attention to the statutory require-
ment of engaging in a “pattern of racketeering of activity.”72  The
petitioner in Sedima, a Belgian corporation, brought suit against its
joint business partner, an American corporation, alleging that they
engaged in actions of mail and wire fraud, which effectively limited
the profits gained by the petitioner corporation.73  Arguing against
the lower court’s holding that the injury in question did not
amount to a pattern of racketeering, the Court detailed that
“[w]here the plaintiff alleges each element of the [RICO] violation,
the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate
acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of
the [RICO] violation is the commission of those acts in connection
with the conduct of an enterprise.”74  Ultimately, the Court re-
manded the case for further factual findings on the requisite predi-
cate acts, with the newly determined outcome that the injury pled
67. For a further discussion about the history of RICO, see infra notes 68–83 R
and accompanying text.
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 1960–1964 (explaining Organized Crime Control Act and
different sections of codified RICO legislation).
69. See § 1962 (detailing prohibited activities under RICO and defining an
enterprise for purposes of RICO).
70. See § 1964(c) (detailing civil remedies for violations of RICO); see also
Catherine M. DiDomenico, Civil RICO: The Propriety of Concurrent State Court Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 271, 274 (1988) (declaring “[c]ivil RICO
went largely unnoticed for almost a decade”).
71. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
72. See id. at 495–96 (“There is no room in the statutory language for an addi-
tional, amorphous ‘racketeering injury’ requirement . . . . [V]iolation . . . requires
(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activ-
ity.”) (emphasis added).  “The ‘extraordinary’ uses to which civil RICO has been
put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses . . .
and the failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of
‘pattern.’”  Id. at 500.
73. See id. (alleging each party entered into joint business venture together,
resulting in allegations that respondent corporation was stealing profits from peti-
tioner corporation).
74. Id. at 497 (supporting Court’s reasoning).
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was sufficient under the statute.75  However, due to the booming
increase of fraud claims resting their claims under the RICO um-
brella, federal courts continue to struggle with the length to which
the statute should reach in the civil context.76  Specifically, courts
began to take notice of the potential created by RICO, allowing for
quick access to the federal court system.77
Despite the controversy surrounding what type of specific ac-
tions count for the purposes of RICO, the standing requirement
pertaining to the type of injury covered has remained relatively sim-
ilar.78  Prior to 2016, statutory standing for RICO claims were sim-
ply viewed under the constitutional precedent of proving (1) injury,
(2) causation, and (3) proof that juridical review would remedy the
injury.79  Currently, courts adhere to a five prong test derived from
that a combination of both statutory and common law to determine
whether a claimant meets the threshold for a RICO claim.80  “To
establish a civil RICO claim against a club, plaintiffs must show the
club (1) conducted or conspired to conduct (2) an enterprise (3)
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as “predicate
acts”) (5) causing injury to plaintiffs’ “business or property.”81  Sy-
nonymous with the statute enacted in 1980, courts today continue
to require claimants to begin by establishing evidence of harm,
proximately caused by a violation of RICO, to a business or prop-
75. See id. at 500 (detailing procedural history of case).
76. See Lisa A. Huestis, RICO: The Meaning of ‘Pattern’ Since Sedima, 54 BROOK.
L. REV. 621, 622 (Apr. 1988) (“Despite the clear congressional intent to reach or-
ganized crime, the federal courts witnessed a rapid increase in the use of civil
RICO against legitimate businesses and commercial enterprises.”); see also Sedima,
473 U.S. at 494 (“The court [ ] is not alone in struggling to define ‘racketeering
injury’ . . .”).
77. See Huestis, supra note 76 (explaining that “[i]n response to this expensive R
use of RICO, courts attempted to limit judicially the reach of civil RICO”.).
78. See Canyon County v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., 519 U.S. 969 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“[C]ivil RICO plaintiff[s] must show: (1) that [their] alleged harm qualifies as
injury to [their] business or property; and (2) that [their] harm was “by reason of”
the RICO violation.”); see also Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783,
785 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Showing of ‘injury’ for RICO purposes requires proof of
concrete financial loss, and not mere ‘injury to a valuable intangible property in-
terest.’” (citing Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d. 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990))).
79. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (detailing
constitutional threshold for establishing standing under specific cause of action).
80. See Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342, 346
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)–(d), 1964(c) and Living Designs, Inc.
v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005)) (explaining
five-step test to determine if RICO claim exists).
81. Id. at 346 (providing five prong test).
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erty interest.82  The multi-pronged standing requirement of RICO
has been narrowly construed and, as a result, bars application of the
requirement to those whose injuries do not qualify as pertaining to
property or economic interest.83
The RICO statute garnered increased attention in recent
years.84  Attractive for its ability to apply to a pattern of conduct, as
illustrated by its congressional intent, the RICO statute has pro-
vided many claimants hope that it may provide a clever way to ma-
neuver around deadlocked negligence-based law within
professional sports.85  However, the recent adjudication in Evans
curtailed that sense of hope.86  In the wake of changes to knowl-
edge surrounding athletic injuries, many of which were unbe-
knownst to the athletes at the time they were sustained and whose
effects manifested throughout the athlete’s life, the RICO statute
should be construed broadly, and its standing should be inter-
preted to recognize personal injury as encompassed in an injury to
a person’s “business interest and personal property.”87
82. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 741 F.2d 482, 475 (2d Cir. 198), rev’d.
473 U.S 479 (1985) (holding standing required suffering “injury of the type RICO
was designed to prevent”).
83. See Keller v. Strauss, 480 Fed. Appx. 552, 554 (11th Cir. 2012) (detailing
how claimant who experienced adverse side effects resulting from medical care did
not have cognizable RICO claim since he could only assert personal injury dam-
ages); see also Moore v. Eli Lilly & Co., 626 F. Supp. 365, 367–68 (D. Mass. 1986)
(showing how loss of consortium claim, resulting from ingestion of  medication,
did not constitution claims for injury to property, solely personal injuries).
84. See Drago, supra note 28, at 606 (detailing how some courts believe as- R
sumption of risk defense should only be applied in regards to contributory negli-
gence issues and some believe defense should be regarded as complete defense);
see also Ward v. Chanana, No. C 07-06290 JW, 2008 WL 5383582, at *3–5 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 23, 2008) (explaining when statute of limitations begins to toll for RICO
purposes).
85. For a further discussion about the text of the statute itself as well as the
intent for enactment, see infra notes 62–83 and accompanying text; see also Ward, R
2008 WL 5383582 (explaining how plaintiff suffered financial loss resulting from
selling company to another business).
86. See Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342,
347–48 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that plaintiffs were unable to establish standing
for their RICO claims).
87. For a further discussion about how the RICO statute should change and
how this would have aided claimants in the Evans case, see infra notes 143–151 and R
accompanying text.
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III. EVANS V. ARIZONA CARDINAL FOOTBALL CLUB, LLC
Twelve retired NFL players, and the estate of one deceased
player, initiated suit in Evans.88  Together, they each brought claims
against thirty-two defendant clubs claiming a violations of the RICO
statute, as well as concealment, intentional misrepresentation, and
conspiracy under applicable state law.89  Alleging ongoing practices
stemming from the 1960s, claimants argued each of these practices
operated in a manner that effectively subordinated each plaintiffs’
health and wellbeing in the name of the return to play mentality.90
Plaintiffs asserted the implementation of this league-wide “return to
play” mentality manifested in a variety of methods.91  Specifically,
plaintiffs claimed that the clubs faced an inherent conflict between
increasing profits from game viewership and decreasing revenue
due to injured players sitting out games.92  The complaint alleges
that rather than following the precedent of intercollegiate athletics
by increasing player numbers and rest time, the NFL and its mem-
bers instead prioritized their economic goals over the safety of their
88. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (defining claimants in lawsuit); see also
Compl. at ¶¶ 7–13, Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342 (Dckt. No. 136) (detailing each
claimant’s name, length of time playing in NFL, and current symptoms).
89. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 346 (explaining original and amended claims
brought against each club affiliated with NFL).  “[T]he alleged ‘misrepresentation’
[was] failing to inform players that club trainers violated the Controlled Sub-
stances Act by giving them medications.” Id. at 352 (alleging “return to play” cul-
ture operated in conspiratorial way between all thirty-two member clubs).
90. See Compl. at ¶¶ 2–4, Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342 (Dckt. No. 136) (“Begin-
ning in the 1960s, professional football began to rival baseball at the country’s
national sport.  Football is far-better suited for television—a veritable match made
in heaven.”).  For a further discussion of the specific allegations of disregard for
health and well-being of players, see infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. R
91. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (“First, [team officials] pressured players
to return to play as soon as possible despite injury or pain.  Second, [clubs] pres-
sured players pressured players to return to play through non-guaranteed con-
tracts that could be terminated at any time . . . . Third, club doctors and trainers
allegedly provided injured players with prescription medications in lieu of ade-
quate rest to return them to play as soon as possible.”) (emphasis omitted) (citing
Sec. Am. Compl. at ¶ 19, Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, Case No. 3:16-cv-
01030-WHA); see also Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, 3:16-cv-02324
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (Dckt. No. 1) ¶¶ 2–4 (“[I]ndividuals running the Clubs began to
realize the necessity of keeping their best players on the field to ensure not only
attendance at games but also the best possible TV ratings.  That realization re-
sulted in the creation of a return to play practice or policy by the Clubs that priori-
tized profit over players’ health and safety.”).
92. See Sec. Am. Compl. at ¶ 102, Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC,
Case No. 3:16-cv-01030-WHA (“The Clubs have recognized the appeal of violence
associated with football since the inception of the sport . . .  [T]o give the public
the best product possible, marquee players need to play, even if they are injured or
in pain.”).
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players.93  This resulted in an attitude engulfed by “profit, media,
non-guaranteed contracts, and drugs” that pushed players to roboti-
cally compete, regardless of their health, or risk losing their jobs.94
Thus, injured players who miraculously “returned to play” were
praised for their courageous attitude and team officials did not
question the long term health effects of the players’ decision.95
These players argued that the pervasive nature of this damag-
ing mentality led to violations of the standards for player safety and
well-being, contrary to the clubs’ representations that the players’
health and well-being would be a priority.96  The players argued
that although they technically chose to play through their injuries,
the staff associated with the team neglected their duty to put the
athletes’ health and long-term well-being first.97  The complaint
showed that contrary to the defendants’ representations, teams ad-
ministered prescription drugs to injured athletes in a manner that
harmed their health and well-being.98  These prescription drugs
were often given to players in excessive amounts and without any
proper information about long term effects.99  Instead of allowing
93. See id. (explaining how NCAA resolves issues with player rest, health, and
well-being and showing how NFL’s model vastly differs); see also id. at ¶ 103 (detail-
ing how “[c]lubs have resolved [the] inherent conflict [of interest] in favor of
profit over safety with more games, less rest (e.g. Thursday night football), and
smaller rosters that save payroll expenses”).
94. See id. at ¶ 103 (“[T]hey achieve their ends through a business plan in
which every Club employee – general managers, coaches, doctors, trainers and
players – has a financial interest in returning players to the game as soon as possi-
ble . . . . Everyone’s job and salary depend[ed] on [the] simple fact . . . .  As
professional football took off, these bedrock concepts would become the driving
force behind every business decision made by the Clubs.”).
95. See id. at ¶ 105 (“Dramatic collisions between players were highlighted in
slow motion. Players who returned to the game with severe injuries were lauded as
courageous heroes. These same themes were repeated by the broadcast
networks.”).
96. See id. (“[T]he clubs represented ‘that their medical professionals priori-
tize[d] the players’ health, and that the plaintiffs believed ‘that doctors . . . and
other medical personnel prioritize [their] best interests and would not intention-
ally advise a procedure or prescribe or distribute a medication that would injure
their health.’” (citing Compl. at ¶ 21)).
97. See Compl. at ¶ 22, Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, 231 F. Supp. 3d
342 (N.D. CA. 2017) (explaining “[t]he health interests of the players were in-
creasingly subordinated and forgotten as the Clubs evolved into multi-billion dol-
lar businesses.”).
98. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 345 (“Club doctors and trainers frequently
gave plaintiffs medications without writing prescriptions, revealing the names of
the drugs used, informing plaintiffs of the ‘long-term health effects of taking con-
trolled substances and prescription medications in the amounts given,’ or counsel-
ing plaintiffs that ‘inadequate rest [would] result in permanent harm to joints and
muscles.’” (citing Compl. at ¶ 20, Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342 (Dckt. No. 136))).
99. For a further discussion about the specific allegations relating to the use
of prescription drugs, see supra note 80 and accompanying text. R
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players’ time to heal from injury or stress, all members of the club
were engaged in the return to play mentality by pushing the players
to return to the playing field as soon as possible, regardless of the
potential harm it presented.100  By subordinating player’s long-term
health and injury recovery, the longevity and success of the plaintiff
players’ careers were ultimately negatively impacted.101
The players’ complaint describes the nature of the injuries sus-
tained as a result of their respective clubs’ disregard for their health
as solely in the name of entertainment.102  In defense of the ath-
letes neglecting their own health choices in returning to play with-
out proper supervision, acquiesce to return to play plaintiffs
emphasized the average length of an NFL career being 3.3 years as
yet another inescapable incentive to return to play as soon as possi-
ble.103  Moreover, plaintiffs highlighted the existence of non-guar-
anteed contracts, which effectively operated in such a way that
further pushed them to return to the sport.104  Ultimately, the
plaintiffs accused the league and its thirty-two club members of coor-
dinating with one another in the utilization this return to play
mentality.105  The clubs moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint,
arguing that both of the newly added RICO claims, that defendants
violated RICO and concealed the violations, should be dismissed
100. For a discussion about how the “return to play” mentality manifested
amongst the team, see supra notes 52–61 and accompanying text. R
101. See Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. 3:16-cv-02324 (N.D.
Cal. 2014), (Dckt. No. 1) ¶¶ 65–80 (detailing specific plaintiff allegations of how
their injuries were a direct result of NFL’s conduct and had an effect on playing
career); see also Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 347 (“Turning, first, to plaintiffs’ allega-
tions ‘that their playing careers were unnecessarily shortened . . . .’”).
102. See Compl. at ¶ 6, Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. 3:16-
CV-01030-WHA, 2017 WL 3046921 at *7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2017) (Trial Motion,
Memorandum and Affidavit) (“Plaintiffs suffer from two discrete sets of injuries
directly caused by Defendants’ omissions and concealment: (1) internal organ in-
juries; and (2) muscular/skeletal injuries exacerbated by the Clubs’ administration
of Medications to keep players on the field or in practice.”).
103. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 346 (citing Compl. at ¶¶ 51, 89 (Dckt. No.
136)) (describing average length of NFL career as incentive to return to play with-
out proper recovery).
104. See Evans, 3:16-cv-02324 (N.D. Cal. 2014), (Dckt. No. 1) ¶¶ 89, 99 (sum-
marizing how non-guaranteed contracts created environment heavily influenced
by economic pressures and possibility of being replaced).
105. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 346 (“First, members of each club made up
the NFL executive committee, which met on at least an annual basis.  General
Managers, trainers, and doctors also met at regular functions. Second, the clubs
equally shared revenue from their television deals. Third, the clubs jointly man-
dated certain procedures to control drug storage and distribution, including via
the NFL Security Office.  The clubs also created the NFL Prescription Drug Advi-
sory Committee to oversee administration of controlled substances and prescrip-
tion drugs to players.”).
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with prejudice, “because (1) plaintiffs cannot state a RICO claim,
(2) plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law, and (3)
plaintiffs’ intentional misrepresentation and concealment claims
are not pled with the requisite particularity.”106
IV. THE PLAYERS V. THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DISTRICT COURT
In its review of Evans, the Northern District of California Dis-
trict Court began with a decision to bypass the threshold matter of
the statute of limitations issue and entertain plaintiffs’ RICO
claims.107  Before doing so, the court stated that the last “unneces-
sarily shortened” NFL career in question would have ended well
over ten years ago.108  In its criticism of the plaintiffs’ claim, the
court asserted that all the factors alleged in the complaint were fac-
tors well known to the plaintiffs and their teammates during the
period in question.109  Although the court conceded the fact that
the plaintiffs were not fully knowledgeable about the extent their
injuries at the time, the court reasoned that the players had full
constructive knowledge of the fact that those injuries could pose
problems to their post-career endeavors.110  As a result, the court
identified that plaintiffs had, at minimum, well-established con-
structive knowledge, and therefore, the statute of limitations had
run.111  However, the court continued to go through the entirety of
the analysis for a RICO claim, despite this threshold issue.112
106. Id. (explaining multiple holdings announced by court); see also Evans v.
Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, No. 3:16-CV-01030-WHA, 2017 WL 3046921 at
*3–7 (N.D. Cal.) (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) (No. 3:16-CV-01030-
WHA) (explaining defendant’s response to each claim detailed in plaintiffs’
amended complaint).
107. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 347 (“Assuming for present purposes that
such injuries even qualify as injuries to ‘business or property’ within the meaning
of RICO, plaintiffs’ claim is plainly barred by the statute of limitations.”).
108. See id. (“[T]he NFL careers of the seven RICO plaintiffs ended in 1985
(Harris), 1991 (Carreker), 1993 (Goode), 1999 (Lofton), 2000 (Evans), 2001 (Ash-
more), and 2004 (Wunsche) . . . . [T]hus end[ing] over a decade prior to the filing
of this action.”).
109. See id. (explaining how actions resulted in players being pressured to
play and consume medications instead of fully healing from injuries).
110. See id. (“[P]articularly true since, based on plaintiffs’ own allegations, the
brevity of NFL careers . . . and even the widespread practice of substance abuse . . .
were well-known realities of the profession.” (citing Dkt. No. 136 at 51–56)).
111. See id. at 347–48 (citing Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir.
2001)) (explaining players “had enough information to warrant an investigation
which, if reasonably diligent, would have led to discovery of the [injury]”).
112. See id. at 349 (“[P]laintiff’s position boils down to arguing that the limita-
tions period could not start running until they not only discovered that they had
suffered injuries to business or property due to the clubs’ alleged conduct, but also
19
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The court began its analysis to determine if a cognizable injury
was present and did this by assessing the five prongs: “(1) con-
ducted or conspired to conduct (2) an enterprise (3) through a
pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as ‘predicate acts’) (5)
causing injury to plaintiffs’ ‘business or property.’”113 Relying on
established precedent in Pincay v. Andrews,114 the court adopted the
“injury discovery” rule.115  This rule details that the clock begins to
run on a plaintiff’s statute of limitations the moment they have rea-
son to know of their injury.116  In its application of this rule, the
court explained the applicable statute of limitations began to toll
for each plaintiff four years from the moment the each specific
plaintiff should have reasonably known about their underlying
injuries.117
In opposition to the court’s opinion that the claimants were
unable to show injury, plaintiffs cited Ward v. Chanana.118  In Ward,
the extent of damage caused by an undisclosed and unknown eco-
nomic injury did not manifest until years down the road.119  Claim-
ants in Evans used the Ward precedent to argue around the
stringent limitations period.120  However, the Evans court rejected
the claimants’ reliance on Ward for two reasons.121  First, the court
stumbled onto a legal theory fitting those facts . . . plaintiffs’ argument is rejected
as contrary to controlling law.”).
113. Id. at 346 (citing 18 U.S.C. §1962(c)–(d), §1964(c)).
114. 238 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2001).
115. See id. at 1109 (“The ‘injury discovery’ rule creates a disjunctive two-
prong test of actual or constructive notice, under which the statute begins running
under either prong.”).
116. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 347 (“The limitations period for civil RICO
claims is four years . . . .  [I]t begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should know
of their underlying injury.” (citing Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987) and Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 553–55 (2000))).
117. See id. (“[P]laintiffs knew or should have known that both shortened
NFL careers and career-ending injuries would diminish their post-NFL pros-
pects.”); see also id. (“The ‘injury discovery’ rule is a ‘disjunctive two-prong test of
actual or constructive notice, under which the statute begins running under either
prong.’” (citing Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001))); see also
Compl. at ¶¶ 51–56, Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342 (Dckt. No. 136) (“Brevity of NFL
careers, the importance of post-NFL career trajectories, and even the widespread
practice of substance abuse to the detriment of players’ health in the NFL were
well-known realities of the profession.”).
118. No. C 07-06290 JW, 2008 WL 5383582 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2008).
119. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 348 (explaining plaintiffs in Ward suffered
financial loss when defendants sold company to another business and plaintiffs did
not learn until 2006, seven years later, of plans to take business public).
120. See id. (citing plaintiffs’ argument that limitations period should have
started when they discovered who caused their injuries).
121. See id. (“First . . . their RICO claim contains no allegations of any decep-
tion comparable to that in Ward . . .  Second, . . . ‘discovery of the injury, not
20
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explained the plaintiffs could not successfully argue the teams con-
cealed the facts surrounding their injuries because both types of
conduct alleged in the complaint, pressuring players to play and
giving them medication, would have been readily known to the
plaintiffs.122  Second, in support of their rejection, the court cited
Rotella v. Wood,123 a case in which the court compared RICO claims
to medical malpractice claims.124  However, using language from
the Rotella court regarding notice of injury for purposes of tolling
the statute of limitations, the court here quite blatantly explained
that plaintiffs should have known both the critical facts of their in-
jury, as well as who the injury was inflicted by at the time it
happened.125
In an attempt to dissuade the court from its reluctance to find
injury, the plaintiffs argued the clubs’ concealment of certain infor-
mation resulted in plaintiffs being unaware about the extent of
their suffered injuries for quite some time.126  The court again was
unable to identify a rationale connection between the clubs’ con-
cealment and the harmful return to play culture that the plaintiffs
claim led to their injuries.127  In their final attempt to evade the
statute of limitations bar, plaintiffs contended that it was impossible
for them to know the extent of their economic damages stemming
from their injuries based on their post-NFL career opportunities
until the filing of the case.128  However, the court treated plaintiffs’
present day injuries to as separate from those suffered during their
NFL careers.129  In doing so, the court considered plaintiffs’ pre-
discovery of the other elements of a claim, is what starts the clock’ for RICO
claims.” (citing Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000))).
122. See id. (“(1) [P]ressuring plaintiffs to keep playing and (2) giving them
medications so they could do so despite unhealed injuries.”).
123. 528 U.S. 549 (2000).
124. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 348–49 (“[P]laintiff’s ignorance of his legal
rights and his ignorance of the fact of his injury or of its cause should receive
identical treatment.” (quoting U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979))).
125. See id. at 349 (explaining “limitations period required nothing more to
start running”.); see also Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555 (2000) (relying on Kubrick, 444 U.S.
at 122 and ignorance of legal rights and injury).
126. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 348 (arguing plaintiffs’ lack of knowledge is
entirely traceable to efforts by defendant clubs to conceal information surround-
ing use of prescription medication).
127. See id. at 349 (“The amended complaint does not explain how, for exam-
ple, concealment of a medication’s side effects could possibly prevent a player
from knowing that their club was pressuring them to play and giving them medica-
tions to do so.”).
128. See id. (citing Dkt. No. 89 at ¶¶ 3, 7) (arguing statute of limitations
should not bar their RICO claims because “at least some of the alleged underlying
injuries were ‘latent and sow in developing’ and ‘discovered as recently as 2014’”).
129. See id. at 349 (explaining allegations of newly discovered injuries).
21
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sent day injuries to be solely personal injuries and not injuries to
claimants’ business or property.130  In regards to plaintiffs’ past in-
juries, the court again noted that the claimants should have had
some constructive knowledge about the diminished damages result-
ing from the teams’ actions as they were happening and not solely
within the last few years.131  As a result, the court ruled that the
plaintiffs’ RICO claims were foremost dismissed by the tolling of
the statute of limitations, as well as by failure to accurately state an
injury to business or property.132
In addition to the RICO allegations, plaintiffs asserted state law
claims of intentional misrepresentation, concealment, and conspir-
acy against the defendant clubs.133  All parties agreed the inten-
tional misrepresentation and concealment claims were grounded in
fraudulent activity.134  Despite the defendants’ best efforts, the
court found the complaint evidenced no proof of “affirmative ac-
tion” to fulfill the requirements for fraudulent concealment and
thus, dismissed the concealment claims altogether.135  Rather, the
court deemed two of the plaintiffs’ claims to be in need of further
analysis: intentional misrepresentation and concealment.136  The
misrepresentation alleged by Plaintiffs’ counsel was the failure to
inform players that the trainers were violating the Controlled Sub-
stances Act (“CSA”).137  However, the court notes that even if the
plaintiffs did have knowledge their trainers were violating the CSA,
130. See id. (“Even if plaintiffs suggest that they recently lost employment op-
portunities or earning capacity wholly as a result of recently discovered health
problems, such losses, while economic, nonetheless derive from fundamentally per-
sonal injuries and thus cannot give rise to a RICO claim.” (emphasis added) (cit-
ing Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op. Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir. 1992) and
Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1990))).
131. See id. at 350–51 (“The amended complaint, however, does not allege
that any damages from plaintiffs’ diminished post-NFL prospects materialized only
in the four years preceding this action.”).
132. See id. at 351 (explaining how plaintiffs’ RICO claim was barred by the
statute of limitations).
133. See id. (detailing plaintiffs’ state law claims against teams).
134. See id. at 351–52 (“In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 9(b))).
135. See id. at 350 (explaining argument that plaintiffs should have known
their clubs were pressuring them to return to play, regardless of whether they un-
derstood side effects of medication).
136. See id. at 351 (detailing both arguments put forward by plaintiffs’ counsel
with regard to misrepresentation and concealment when administering prescrip-
tion drugs).
137. See id. at 352 (showing how plaintiffs’ counsel at oral argument
presented argument plaintiffs were not informed that club trainers were violating
CSA by giving them medications).
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this would not have directly led to plaintiffs’ injuries being un-
known.138  Moving to the intentional misrepresentation issue, the
court detailed these allegations were specifically in regards to falsely
stating clubs cared about the health and safety of their players, in
spite of their actions illustrating otherwise.139  However, the court
again stated plaintiffs’ complaints with regards to eight of the teams
were sufficient to show certain plaintiffs were coerced to return to
play at the expense of their safety and health.140  Building on this,
the court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss in regards to
the other teams.141
Lastly, plaintiffs attempted to plead their conspiracy claims
against the teams by pointing towards the return to play culture and
how it manifested across multiple teams.142  However, the court lik-
ened the alleged conspiratorial actions to be more akin to a normal
business practice.143  The court sided with the defendant clubs in
agreeing that the business culture of the NFL does not meet the
requisite elements of a conspiracy claim.144  Ultimately, the court
granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss with regard to the state
law conspiracy claims.145
138. See id.  (explaining how no specific instances of CSA violations are found
within the complaint and the “suggestion that plaintiffs suffered all their alleged
injuries because no one told them their trainers were technically violating the CSA
strains credulity”); c.f. Compl. ¶ at 4 (alleging clubs violated CSA by failing to abide
by state laws and federal regulations when administering prescriptions).
139. See id. (alleging intentional misrepresentation with regards to “the medi-
cal risks, side effects, and proper usage of medications”).
140. See id. (detailing relevant clubs as Lions, Raiders, Broncos, Packers,
Seahawks, Dolphins, Charges, and Vikings); see also id. at 352–55 (illustrating de-
tails around each plaintiff’s claim against each defendant club).
141. See id. at 355–56 (“We must remember that a defendant club should only
have to defend against claims pled properly against it.”).
142. See id. at 356 (explaining how this phrase also referenced “return to play
practice or policy”).  For a further discussion regarding the return to play mental-
ity, see supra notes 52–61 and accompanying text. R
143. See id. (“At best, [the] amended complaint alleges the NFL has a return-
to-play culture driving individuals across the board—including trainers, doctors,
and the other players themselves—to prioritize game performance over players’
health.”); c.f.  Compl. ¶¶ at 22–36, Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342 (describing how
return to play mentality directly manifested in failing to allow players to fully re-
cover from their injuries).
144. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 356 (“Agreeing to form the NFL does not
translate to further agreeing to subordinate plaintiffs’ health and safety to re-
turning them to play at all costs.”).
145. See id. at 357 (summarizing court’s holding for each claim).
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V. GIVING ATHLETES A CHANCE: AN ANALYSIS
The claims of the plaintiffs in Evans for loss of opportunities
affiliated with their past and future athletic careers should be cate-
gorized as a loss of property interest or business interest, in accor-
dance with the required standing of RICO.146  While the court
dismissed the RICO claims for being outside the statute of limita-
tions and non-economic injuries, claimants were only left with the
ability to file individual state law claims of intentional misrepresen-
tation and concealment against eight clubs.147  Each claimant par-
took in a professional football career, which entails a requisite level
of physicality.148  In doing so, each had a business interest in their
skill level and how it was displayed over the course of their career,
which each assumed would have lasted at least until the minimally
expected average career length in the NFL.149  However, contrary
to their expectations, they were unable to participate in the sport
professionally for that long as a result of the practices each club
employed during their careers.150
Claimants’ expectations represented their business interests
for both their present and future opportunities that would result
from their playing careers.151  While it is impossible to accurately
predict the amount of money each player would have received if
their careers had not been plagued by their injuries, plaintiffs’
claims should not be barred from having the opportunity to submit
146. For a discussion about the standing requirements for RICO, see supra
notes 59–69 and accompanying text.  For a discussion about a player’s economic R
interest in their body, see supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. R
147. See Compl. ¶ at 61–105, Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342 (detailing all inten-
tional misrepresentation claims initially made against each team).  For a further
discussion about the court’s ultimate holding and the reason for dismissing the
RICO claims, see supra notes 91–112, 118–121 and accompanying text. R
148. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 345–46 (explaining each claimant’s history
of playing in NFL); see also Compl. at ¶¶ 2–3, Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342 (Dckt. No.
136) (detailing specific teams, trainers, and organizations involved).
149. For a further discussion about the business interests resulting from NFL
careers, see supra note 30–51 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion R
about the prospective opportunities available as a result of a successful playing
career, see generally supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text. R
150. See Compl. ¶¶ at 5–9, Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342 (alleging connection
between side effects of prescriptions and future medical problems).  For a further
discussion pertaining to plaintiffs’ inability to have successful careers as a result of
their injuries, see supra notes 88–106 and accompanying text. R
151. See Compl. ¶¶ at 22–36, Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342 (detailing alleged
loss of future monetary opportunities).  For a further discussion about plaintiffs’
wish to have a lengthy career and gain opportunities as a result, see supra note
30–51 and accompanying text. R
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this question to a jury.152  The two primary reasons for the court’s
incorrect holding are: (1) the inappropriate application of prece-
dent to the plaintiffs’ claims; and, (2) a narrow reading of the
standing requirements of RICO that contravened congressional
intent.153
A. Incorrect Application of Precedent
Before outright dismissing the plaintiffs’ RICO claims, the Ev-
ans court examined each case used to support the plaintiffs’ posi-
tions.154  First, the court distinguished plaintiffs’ use of Ward v.
Chanana.155  However, in doing so, the court misconstrued the
reach of the Ward court’s rationale and instead attempted to fill in
the holes using its own analysis with a factually different outcome
represented in Pincay v. Andrews.156  In Pincay, a two-prong test for
determining whether a plaintiff has a readily discoverable injury was
announced and is commonly referred to as the “injury discovery
rule.”157  The Evans court cited to Pincay to support the argument
that the alleged injury should have been easily recognizable at the
time it occurred.158  When the court applied the injury discovery
152. For a further discussion about potential earnings for NFL players and
beyond, see supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text. R
153. For a discussion about the court’s incorrect application of prior prece-
dent, see infra notes 154–185 and accompanying text.  For a discussion about the R
court’s application of the standing requirements of the statute and how it con-
trasted Congress’s intent, see also infra notes 172–184 and accompanying text. R
154. For a further discussion about the court’s analysis of plaintiff’s claims
and how it distinguished cases, see infra notes 163– 171 and accompanying text. R
155. See Evans , 231 F. Supp. 3d at 348 (citing Ward v. Chanana, No. C 07-
06290 JW, 2008 WL 5383582, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2008) (stating in regards to
plaintiffs’ amended complaint “Ward is unhelpful to plaintiffs’ position for two
reasons. First . . . their RICO claim contains no allegations of any deception com-
parable to that in Ward. Second . . . ‘discovery of the injury, not discovery of the
other elements of a claim, is what starts the clock’ for RICO claims.”).
156. See Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining
statute of limitations begins to run when plaintiff knows or should have reason to
know of underlying injury); see also Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 347–48 (explaining
plaintiffs “had enough information to warrant an investigation which, if reasonably
diligent, would have led to discovery of the [injury]” (quoting Pincay, 283 F.3d at
1106)); c.f. Pincay, 238 F.3d at 1110 (explaining equitable tolling doctrines as al-
lowing plaintiffs to establish concealment and conduct that would have led reason-
able person not to believe they possessed RICO claim).
157. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 346–47 (citing Pincay, 283 F.3d at 1109)
(explaining test as whether claimants knew or should have known about their
injury).
158. See id. at 347–48 (explaining rationale for using Pincay, 283 F.3d at 1109
for statute of limitations purposes).
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rule in Evans, the court found the plaintiffs’ possessed knowledge
had placed them on constructive notice of the injury.159
In turn, Ward presented the notion that the limitations period
on a RICO claim cannot start running until claimants are able to
identify the source of their injury.160  Interestingly, in Evans, the
court rationalized the outcome in Ward as the respective judge
grants plaintiffs time to develop further factual development.161
However, the same rationale for refusal to dismiss could be used in
the present case in order not to penalize plaintiffs for failing to
distinguish their injury.162
Pincay and Ward were not meant to be read in opposition to
one another, but should be read in conjunction with one another
in order to provide a guide for how to move through the process of
identifying whether a claimant possesses a valid cause of action.163
Consistent with the congressional intent of a broad application of
RICO, the injury discovery rule in Pincay should be used to first,
identify if the injury in question was known or readily known to
those involved.164  Then, under certain factual circumstances, Ward
should be used as an exception if claimants allege they were unable
to truly know the extent and origin of their injuries until after the
statute of limitations period.165  Reading each precedent in this
159. See Pincay, 238 F.3d at 1109 (arguing that statute of limitations could not
have begun to run because fiduciary relationship existed between plaintiff and
defendant which would have barred them from finding out about injury).
160. See Ward v. Chanana, No. C 07-06290 JW, 2008 WL 5383582, at *1–2
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2008) (explaining factual situation of claimant’s alleged eco-
nomic injury).
161. See id. (explaining “further factual development was required to conclu-
sively determine that the plaintiff’s RICO claim . . . .”).
162. See id. (explaining why judge in Ward did not want to dismiss plaintiff’s
claim before further factual development transpired).
163. See Ward, 2008 WL 5383582 at *3 (citing dual prong test from Pincay
before ultimately holding for claimants in case).  For a further discussion about
the relevant portions of Ward and Pincay used in the court’s analysis, see supra
notes 97–105 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion about the meaning R
and definitions involved in RICO statue, see generally supra notes 6–10 and accom- R
panying text.
164. See U.S. v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 593 (1981) (“The language of the
statute however— the most reliable evidence of its intent—reveals that Congress
opted for a far broader definition of the word ‘enterprise,’ . . . ”); see also Pincay,
283 F.3d at 1109 (defining “injury discovery rule” requires plaintiff to have direct
or arguable constructive knowledge of injury in question).
165. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006) (noting
“when a court evaluates a RICO claim proximate causation, the central question it
must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries”); see
also Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Elec. Motor & Supply, Inc., 262 F.3d 260, 264 (4th
Cir. 2001) (detailing Fourth Circuit’s standing requirement that “plaintiff only has
standing to bring suit if he can show damage to ‘business or property’ proximately
26
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fashion would result in the increased applicability of RICO to a vari-
ety of claims while still allowing further standing elements to re-
spectively limit claims.166
The court also relied on Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op Ass’n167 to
assert the distinction between an individual’s personal injuries and
injuries to an individual’s economic or property interest.168  The
Oscar court cited language from prior decisions stating the congres-
sional purpose behind the statute was to “thwart the organized
criminal invasion and acquisition of legitimate business enterprises
and property.”169  However, subsequent courts have refused to ap-
ply this analysis in such a strict manner, as Oscar did, if they even
apply it at all.170  This evolution shows the breadth in the applica-
tion of the RICO statute and how different courts have departed
from its initial 1992 understanding.171
caused by [a] defendant’s RICO violation”); cf. North Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating
Co. v. Cigna Healthcare, 781 F.3d 182 (5th Cir. 2015) (dismissing RICO claim
because plaintiff did not explain how defendant’s use of racketeering income
caused injury); Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998) (detailing need
for injury to result from investment of finances resulting from racketeering ac-
tions); Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F.3d 129 (6th Cir. 1994) (showing dismissal
of claim for lack of causation between investment of racketeering funds and plain-
tiff’s injury).  For a further discussion about the congressional intent of RICO, see
supra notes 28–38 and accompanying text. R
166. For a further discussion regarding different Circuit Court’s application
of the standing requirement of RICO, see supra note 165. See also Compl. at ¶¶ R
3–5, Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342 (N.D. Cal.
2017) Dckt. (No. 136) (explaining racketeering behavior of member teams); Dent
v. NFL, 902 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2018) (illustrating claims made by former players
alleging similar claims to those in Evans).  For a further discussion about the broad
purposes of the RICO statue, see supra notes 23–34 and accompanying text.
167. 965 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1992).
168. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 349 (citing Oscar, 965 F.2d at 785) (explain-
ing qualifying injuries under RICO as injuries to finance or property); see also id.
(detailing injury in case as discomfort and annoyance with neighbor).
169. See Oscar, 965 F.2d at 786 (explaining holding of court in Gentry v. Reso-
lution Trust Corp, 937 F.2d 899, 918–19 (3d Cir. 1991) in regard to purpose of
RICO statute).
170. See id. at 785 (showing RICO requires injury to property or business); cf.
Nat’l Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 2d 213
(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to embrace other circuit’s holding regarding losses in
RICO context and allowing claimant smokers to state RICO claim against tobacco
companies).
171. See Oscar, 965 F.2d at 785 (detailing Ninth Circuit’s view of what qualified
as injury for purposes of RICO claim in 1992); see also Philip Morris, 74 F. Supp. 2d
at 213 (showing court expanding definition of injury within RICO statute).  For a
further discussion about the initial purpose of the RICO statute, see supra notes
42–63 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion about how some courts
have departed from initial application, see supra notes 130–138 and accompanying
text.
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B. The True Standing Requirements of RICO
The Evans court and cases subsequent to it should read the
standing requirement as being an injury to an individual’s business
or property interests.172  While taking historical context into consid-
eration, RICO’s text provides an intended meaning: to encompass a
pattern or enterprise of racketeering activity.173  Changing the ap-
plication of RICO’s standing requirement would not be contrary to
congressional intent.174  While it might be unlikely that Congress
initially imagined the statute would apply in a sports context, the
broad rationale for its enactment would not preclude this applica-
tion.175  Courts have consistently adapted old precedent to new
standards when reviewing complaints, and in this case, the same
should occur.176  When reviewing RICO violations, courts should be
consistently adding to their body of knowledge and understanding
as to what a business interest truly is.177 Allowing an athlete to fulfill
the threshold standing requirements of the statute by alleging in-
jury to their business, would comport with previous RICO
precedent.178
Legislatures should also take notice of the expansive nature
with which the RICO statute is being utilized by litigants who are
barred by the state law of their respective jurisdiction.179  In doing
172. For a further discussion about the broad intent of the RICO statute, see
supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion about a player’s
economic interests in regards to professional sports, see supra notes 26–41 and
accompanying text.
173. For a further discussion regarding the text and purpose of the RICO
statute, see supra notes 41–61 and accompanying text.
174. See Oscar, 965 F.2d at 786 (citing Gentry, 937 F.2d at 918–19) (explaining
§ 1964(c)’s language as being clear and only applicable to harm to business and
property only).
175. For a further discussion about the congressional intent behind RICO
and cases interpreting the standing its elements, see supra notes 7–9 and accompa- R
nying text.  For a further discussion regarding the evolution of sports injuries and
their treatment by the law, see supra notes 24–28 and accompanying text. R
176. For a further discussion regarding the reason for creating the RICO stat-
ute, see supra notes 68–77. R
177. For a further discussion about the court’s holding that claimants’ inju-
ries were not economic or property interests, see supra 78–88 and accompanying R
text.
178. For a further discussion regarding the standing requirements of RICO,
see supra notes 72–84 and accompanying text. R
179. See Rick Maese, NFL Abuse of Painkillers and Other Drugs Described in Court
Filings, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/red
skins/nfl-abuse-of-painkillers-and-other-drugs-described-in-court-filings/2017/03/
09/be1a71d8-035a-11e7-ad5b-d22680e18d10_story.html?utm_term=.c2d67784eaf2
[https://perma.cc/Y58S-RT7Z] (explaining NFL’s over consumption problem);
see Axson, supra note 9 (explaining other cases filed under RICO statute).
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so, legislatures should amend their statutes to require injury to a
person’s personal interests, as opposed to solely their business or
property.180  The elements currently required in order to success-
fully establish standing for a RICO claim operate in a manner
which prematurely bars a claim of injury to a person’s business or
property interest as a result of an organized pattern of activity.181
While this addition may increase the amount of litigants able to
establish standing under RICO, the revision would not contravene
the true purpose of the statute.182  Further, doing so would not re-
sult in RICO becoming applicable to persons solely with personal
injuries, which would be in contradiction to RICO’s purpose.183
Implementing these changes would carve out an area for the courts
to determine when a claim, which on its face looks to be a personal
injury, actually affects a claimant’s business or property interests in
a negative way.184
VI.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
If the standing requirements for the RICO statute remain the
same, both in application and wording, former professional ath-
letes will continue to be unable to successfully establish standing for
their injuries.185  Currently, RICO does not allow current or former
athletes who have suffered from a pattern of organized activity to
recover for their injuries.186  The overlap with personal injuries ver-
sus injuries to a person’s business or economic interest is a blurred
line not only walked by the legislature, but by the courts as well.187
180. For a further discussion on the current standing requirements for RICO
claims, see supra notes 32–37 and accompanying text. R
181. For a further discussion about the implications of the current RICO
standing elements, see supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text. R
182. For a further discussion about the intent behind the RICO statute, see
supra notes 38–50 and accompanying text. R
183. For further discussion regarding Congress’s purpose when enacting
RICO statute, see supra notes 38–50 and accompanying text. R
184. For a discussion about the current application of the standing require-
ment for RICO, see supra notes 23–34 and accompanying text.  For a discussion
about how the RICO standing requirements should be read, see supra notes
142–149 and accompanying text.
185. See Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342, 349
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (illustrating plethora of claimants unable to file claims because
their injuries were deemed to be personal injuries and not economic or property
injuries).
186. For a further discussion about the requirements for RICO standing and
how the court in Evans precluded plaintiffs from establishing standing, see supra
notes 77–88 and accompanying text.
187. For a further discussion about the economic interests of athletes and
how their business interests involve keeping their bodies in pristine shape, see
supra notes 35–46 and accompanying text.
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While the landscape for knowledge of player injuries is consistently
expanding, the law should adapt to accommodate this growth, as
well.188  Further, societies’ knowledge about patterns of activity that
increasingly qualify as criminal or conspiratorial activity is growing
as well.189  Under this set of circumstances, the RICO statute repre-
sents an opportunity to fill the gap for those suffering from long-
standing injuries that resulted from a pattern of conduct.190  The
only thing missing is the legislative change.191
A change in the wording of the statute itself could potentially
result in less claims being filed altogether or more claims being out
rightly dismissed by clarifying the purpose of the statute.192  The
existing framework for standing bars an influx of litigants from
facially stating a RICO claim solely for the purposes of utilizing the
federal court system.193  Adapting the way the RICO standing
prongs are applied would not run contrary to this purpose because
the statute was enacted to provide relief for those suffering from a
pattern of misconduct.194  Opponents are likely to argue that ex-
panding the statute will unnecessarily increase litigation and place a
188. See Oscar v. Univ. Students Co-op, Ass’n, 965 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1992)
(giving example of what ninth circuit believed to be qualifying injuries for RICO in
1992).  For a further discussion about the increase in player injury knowledge, see
supra notes 2–18 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion on increased
knowledge about overuse of painkillers as a result of bad rehabilitation methods in
sport, see supra notes 55–59, 136–141 and accompanying text.
189. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 74 F.
Supp. 2d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (illustrating example of court expanding definition
of injury within RICO statute to allow smokers opportunity to sue tobacco compa-
nies).  For a further discussion of recent athlete injuries cases dealing with long
standing periods of activity, see supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
190. See generally Smith, supra note 50 (explaining how injuries have both R
short term and long term effects on athletes).  For a further discussion about re-
cent lawsuits involving groups of athletes suing on behalf of former injuries or
treatment, see supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.  For a further discussion
about the purpose of RICO, see supra notes 89–104 and accompanying text. R
191. For a further discussion about how the current standing requirements
for RICO contravene legislative intent, see supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text.
For a further discussion about the impact of reading the standing requirements in
a different manner, see supra notes 142–150 and accompanying text.
192. For a further discussion about how the RICO requirements operated in
general and to this case specifically, see supra notes 108–145, 167–188 and accom- R
panying text.
193. See Peter J. Henning, RICO Lawsuits Are Tempting, But Tread Lightly, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/16/business/
dealbook/harvey-weinstein-rico.html [https://perma.cc/TSR7-DFV5] (illustrating
how two RICO cases in particular are utilized its broad applicability).  For a further
discussion about how some litigants utilize RICO to gain access to the federal court
system, see supra notes 76–84 and accompanying text. R
194. For a further discussion regarding the legislature’s purpose for creating
the RICO statute, see supra notes 62–87 and accompanying text. R
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burden on courts to apply the RICO umbrella to an increasing
amount of plaintiffs.195  However, the current standing require-
ments for RICO already operate in a manner that arbitrarily allows
for a broad range of plaintiffs to establish standing.196  The differ-
ence here, however, is that while professional athletes should fall
under this umbrella, they are left out in the rain.197  Although spec-
ulative, it is probable that the outcome of a change to the legisla-
tion itself would be claimants choosing not to file claims under the
RICO statute know they do not have standing.198  Doing so would
not contradict the legislature’s intent in its enactment of the RICO
statute because the statute sought to apply to situations where a per-
son acquired money as a result of engaging in a pattern of racke-
teering activity.199
While the court in Evans focused its analysis on the end prod-
uct—the harm alleged as a result of past actions—it ought to have
analyzed the totality of actions, including current knowledge, in
comparison to the time of the claims.200  The “return to play”
mentality, combined with the hazardous over prescription of
painkillers, should have been viewed by the court in conjunction
with current societal knowledge about the drugs at issue.201  In the
past five years, the use of prescription drugs, commonly referenced
as opioids, have increased dramatically and caused irrefutable dam-
195. See Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club, LLC, 231 F. Supp. 3d 342,
348–50 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (explaining need to apply RICO to solely injuries to busi-
ness or property and not personal injuries).  For a further discussion regarding the
conflicting manner in which Circuit courts apply RICO standing requirements, see
supra note 165 and accompanying text. R
196. See Sedima, S.P.R.L v. Imrex Co, 473 U.S. 479 (1985) (holding Second
Circuit’s interpretation of RICO was inconsistent with Congress’s intent to apply
statute broadly).  For a further discussion about the influx of RICO claims in re-
cent years based on the statute’s broad wording, see supra notes 51–54 and accom-
panying text.
197. For a further discussion regarding athletes’ inability to meet standing
requirements of RICO because personal injuries do not qualify as financial inju-
ries, see supra 107–135 and accompanying text. R
198. For a further discussion about the possible outcome of changing the in-
terpretation, application, or wording of the RICO statute, see supra notes 112–126
and accompanying text.
199. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (a)–(d) (explaining activity that is outlawed by
RICO as “enterprises” engaged in “pattern of racketeering”).  For a further discus-
sion about RICO, see supra notes 6–18 and accompanying text.
200. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 349–50 (showing why plaintiffs should have
known about injuries as they were happening, even though knowledge about long-
term effects of opioid use was minimal).
201. For a further discussion regarding the “return to play” mentality, see
supra notes 52–72 and accompanying text. R
31
DeSilvester: At What Cost?  Analyzing The Standing Element Of  The Racketeer I
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2020
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\27-1\VLS103.txt unknown Seq: 32  2-MAR-20 12:05
98 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 27: p. 67
age to the United States.202  Common effects of these drugs include
both short term effects, such as drowsiness or confusion, and long
term effects, such as brain damage, liver damage, and death by
overdose.203  The overuse of opioids has been a direct result of
under-regulation, over-prescriptions, and a lack of consumer knowl-
edge about the long term effects of this brand of drugs.204  One of
the gripping characteristics of the epidemic is its widespread effect
on persons from every walk of life, profession, and age.205  Repre-
senting the present societal underpinnings at work when claimants
filed their case, claims of over-prescription and lack of knowledge
should be heard by the courts with the utmost of importance.206
Given this backdrop of previously unknown knowledge about
the long-term effects of habitual opioid use, the courts should take
this into account when deciding the issue of standing.207  Claimants
repeatedly voiced their lack of knowledge about the hazards of
over-consumption of team prescribed painkillers, only to be met
with apathy at best.208  While society is only recently learning about
the detrimental effects of over-prescription and addiction in re-
gards to opioids, the court presumes plaintiffs possess a predis-
202. See Opioid Overdose Crisis, NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE (last updated Jan.
2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis
[https://perma.cc/4BZL-U4TK] (explaining different time periods that caused in-
crease in opioid overdoses and over prescriptions).
203. See What are Prescription Opioids, NAT’L INST. DRUG ABUSE (last updated
June 2019), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/prescription-
opioids [https://perma.cc/7HHJ-2277] (detailing common side effects from over-
consumption and over prescription of opioid drugs).
204. See What is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, HHS https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/
about-the-epidemic/index.html [https://perma.cc/36NJ-PUFB] (last updated
Sept. 4, 2019) (explaining statistics for causes and sources of opioid overuse and
addiction).
205. See Opioid Crisis Data, AM. ASS’N OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS, https://
www.aana.com/practice/clinical-practice-resources/opioid-crisis-resources/
opioid-crisis-data [https://perma.cc/WPS6-G9K5] (last visited Jan,. 28, 2020) (de-
tailing different factors for addictions such as age and prior drug use).
206. For a further discussion about how the standing requirement for RICO
should be changed by the legislature or interpreted differently by the courts, see
supra 167–199 notes and accompanying text. R
207. For a further discussion about the current opioid epidemic and research
pertaining to that, see supra notes 54–59 and accompanying text.
208. See Sec. Am. Compl., pg. 31–34, Evans v. Ariz. Cardinals Football Club,
LLC, 231 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (detailing methods with which teams dis-
tributed painkiller medications in lieu of proper rest and rehabilitation).
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posed knowledge and complacency with the painkillers they
overused throughout their professional careers.209
Catherine DeSilvester*
209. See Evans, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 349–50 (detailing court’s explanation as to
why plaintiffs should have possessed knowledge about their injuries).  For a further
discussion about the increase in knowledge about long-term opioid use, see supra
notes 56–61 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A. in Political Science, Augusta University, 2017.
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